Often it is the responsibility of the corporate IT department to negotiate and maintain long-distance communication lines. 12 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace, International Security 41, no. Each control system vendor calls the database something different, but nearly every control system assigns each sensor, pump, breaker, etc., a unique number. The target must believe that the deterring state has both the capabilities to inflict the threatening costs and the resolve to carry out a threat.14 A deterring state must therefore develop mechanisms for signaling credibility to the target.15 Much of the Cold War deterrence literature focused on the question of how to convey resolve, primarily because the threat to use nuclear weaponsparticularly in support of extended deterrence guarantees to allieslacks inherent credibility given the extraordinarily high consequences of nuclear weapons employment in comparison to any political objective.16 This raises questions about decisionmakers willingness to follow through on a nuclear threat. For instance, he probably could not change the phase tap on a transformer. Much of the focus within academic and practitioner communities in the area of cyber deterrence has been on within-domain deterrence, and even studies of cross-domain deterrence have been largely concerned with the employment of noncyber instruments of power to deter cyberattacks. >; Zak Doffman, Cyber Warfare: U.S. Military Admits Immediate Danger Is Keeping Us Up at Night, https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/07/21/cyber-warfare-u-s-military-admits-immediate-danger-is-keeping-us-up-at-night/#7f48cd941061, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Deterrence and the Cold War,, Robert J. Prior to the 2018 strategy, defending its networks had been DODs primary focus; see, https://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/final_2015_dod_cyber_strategy_for_web.pdf. Using this simple methodology, a high-level calculation of cyber risk in an IT infrastructure can be developed: Cyber risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Information Value. Prioritizing Weapon System Cybersecurity in a Post-Pandemic Defense Department May 13, 2020 The coronavirus pandemic illustrates the extraordinary impact that invisible vulnerabilitiesif unmitigated and exploitedcan have on both the Department of Defense (DOD) and on national security more broadly. Off-the-shelf tools can perform this function in both Microsoft Windows and Unix environments. As stated in the, , The Department must defend its own networks, systems, and information from, malicious cyber activity and be prepared to defend, when directed, those networks and systems operated by non-DOD-owned Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) and Defense Industrial Base (DIB) entities. Ensuring the Cyber Mission Force has the right size for the mission is important. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. The Department of Defense provides the military forces needed to deter war and ensure our nation's security. The Pentagon's concerns are not limited to DoD systems. Kristen Renwick Monroe (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2002), 293312. These applications can result in real-time operational control adjustments, reports, alarms and events, calculated data source for the master database server archival, or support of real-time analysis work being performed from the engineering workstation or other interface computers. Additionally, the scope and challenge in securing critical military networks and systems in cyberspace is immense. The control system network is often connected to the business office network to provide real-time transfer of data from the control network to various elements of the corporate office. Task Force Report: Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat, (Washington, DC: DOD, January 2013), available at <, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-081.pdf, Audit of the DoDs Management of the Cybersecurity Risks for Government Purchase Card Purchases of the Commercial Off-the-Shelf Items, , Report No. This article recommends the DoD adopt an economic strategy called the vulnerability market, or the market for zero-day exploits, to enhance system Information Assurance. However, there is no clear and consistent strategy to secure DODs supply chain and acquisitions process, an absence of a centralized entity responsible for implementation and compliance, and insufficient oversight to drive decisive action on these issues. Fort Lesley J. McNair , ed. Foreign Intelligence Entity (FIE) is defined in DoD Directive 5240.06 as "any known or suspected foreign organization, person, or group (public, private, or . Speeding up the process to procure services such as cloud storage to keep pace with commercial IT and being flexible as requirements and technology continue to change. . Credibility lies at the crux of successful deterrence. Cyber threats to these systems could distort or undermine their intended uses, creating risks that these capabilities may not be reliably employable at critical junctures. Enhancing endpoint security (meaning on devices such as desktops, laptops, mobile devices, etc), is another top priority when enhancing DOD cybersecurity. Optimizing the mix of service members, civilians and contractors who can best support the mission. In recent years, while DOD has undertaken efforts to assess the cyber vulnerabilities of individual weapons platforms, critical gaps in the infrastructure remain. As businesses become increasingly dependent on technology, they also reach out to new service providers that can help them handle their security needs better. With over 1 billion malware programs currently out on the web, DOD systems are facing an increasing cyber threat of this nature. See James D. Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,, 41, no. Monitors network to actively remediate unauthorized activities. Specifically, the potential for cyber operations to distort or degrade the ability of conventional or even nuclear capabilities to work as intended could undermine the credibility of deterrence due to a reduced capability rather than political will.17 Moreover, given the secret nature of cyber operations, there is likely to be information asymmetry between the deterring state and the ostensible target of deterrence if that target has undermined or holds at risk the deterring states capabilities without its knowledge. 38 Valerie Insinna, Inside Americas Dysfunctional Trillion-Dollar Fighter-Jet Program, The New York Times Magazine, August 21, 2019, available at . 41, no. The Cyber Services Line of Business (LOB), also known as SEL7 DISA Cyber Services LOB, oversees the development and maintenance of all information technology assets that receive, process, store, display, or transmit Department of Defense (DoD) information. Falcon 9 Starlink L24 rocket successfully launches from SLC-40 at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida, April 28, 2021 (U.S. Space Force/Joshua Conti), Educating, Developing and Inspiring National Security Leadership, Photo By: Mark Montgomery and Erica Borghard, Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense [DOD], 2018), available at <, 8/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF, Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority: Command Vision for U.S. Cyber Command, (Washington, DC: U.S. Cyber Command, 2018), available at <, https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20Vision%20April%202018.pdf?ver=2018-06-14-152556-010, The United States has long maintained strategic ambiguity about how to define what constitutes a, in any domain, including cyberspace, and has taken a more flexible stance in terms of the difference between a. as defined in the United Nations charter. Prior to 2014, many of DODs cybersecurity efforts were devoted to protecting networks and information technology (IT) systems, rather than the cybersecurity of the weapons themselves.41 Protecting IT systems is important in its own right. And, if deterrence fails, cyber operations to disrupt or degrade the functioning of kinetic weapons systems could compromise mission assurance during crises and conflicts. Tests, implements, deploys, maintains, reviews, and administers the infrastructure hardware and software that are required to effectively manage the computer network defense service provider network and resources. Each control system vendor is unique in where it stores the operator HMI screens and the points database. Most RTUs require no authentication or a password for authentication. In some, but not all, vendor's control systems, manipulating the data in the database can perform arbitrary actions on the control system (see Figure 15). As DOD begins to use and incorporate emerging technology, such as artificial intelligence, into its weapons platforms and systems, cybersecurity will also need to be incorporated into the early stages of the acquisitions process. . Cyber criminals consistently target businesses in an attempt to weaken our nation's supply chain, threaten our national security, and endanger the American way of life. If a dozen chemical engineers were tasked with creating a talcum powder plant, each of them would use different equipment and configure the equipment in a unique way. Rather, most modern weapons systems comprise a complex set of systemssystems of systems that entail operat[ing] multiple platforms and systems in a collaborate manner to perform military missions.48 An example is the Aegis weapon system, which contains a variety of integrated subsystems, including detection, command and control, targeting, and kinetic capabilities.49 Therefore, vulnerability assessments that focus on individual platforms are unable to identify potential vulnerabilities that may arise when these capabilities interact or work together as part of a broader, networked platform. . Nearly every production control system logs to a database on the control system LAN that is then mirrored into the business LAN. This paper presents a high-level, unclassified overview of threats and vulnerabilities surrounding the U.S. Navy's network systems and operations in cyberspace. National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Supply Chain Risk Management: Reducing Threats to Key U.S. Supply Chains, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2020), available at <, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/supplychain/20200925-NCSC-Supply-Chain-Risk-Management-tri-fold.pdf, For a strategy addressing supply chain security at the national level, beyond DOD and defense institution building. We also describe the important progress made in the fiscal year (FY) 2021 NDAA, which builds on the commissions recommendations. Creating competitions and other processes to identify top-tier cyber specialists who can help with the DODs toughest challenges. For example, as a complement to institutionalizing a continuous process for DOD to assess the cyber vulnerabilities of weapons systems, the department could formalize a capacity for continuously seeking out and remediating cyber threats across the entire enterprise. All of the above a. Most control system networks are no longer directly accessible remotely from the Internet. On October 9th, 2018, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report to the Senate that details the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of the Department of Defense's (DOD) weapon systems. Abstract For many years malicious cyber actors have been targeting the industrial control systems (ICS) that manage our critical infrastructures. But where should you start? Tomas Minarik, Raik Jakschis, and Lauri Lindstrom (Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Art-02-The-Cyber-Deterrence-Problem.pdf, Michael P. Fischerkeller and Richard J. Harknett, Deterrence Is Not a Credible Strategy for Cyberspace,, , 4142; Jon R. Lindsay, Tipping the Scales: The Attribution Problem and the Feasibility of Deterrence Against Cyberattack,. 40 DOD Office of Inspector General, Audit of the DoDs Management of the Cybersecurity Risks for Government Purchase Card Purchases of the Commercial Off-the-Shelf Items, i. DODIG-2019-106 (Washington, DC: DOD, July 26, 2019), 2, available at <, https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/DODIG-2019-106.pdf, Valerie Insinna, Inside Americas Dysfunctional Trillion-Dollar Fighter-Jet Program, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/magazine/f35-joint-strike-fighter-program.html, Robert Koch and Mario Golling, Weapons Systems and Cyber SecurityA Challenging Union, in, ed. The DoD has further directed that cyber security technology must be integrated into systems because it is too expensive and impractical to secure a system after it has been designed The design of security for an embedded system is challenging because security requirements are rarely accurately identified at the start of the design process. Examples of removable media include: 114-92, 20152016, available at <, https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ92/PLAW-114publ92.pdf, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 202. Designs, develops, tests, and evaluates information system security throughout the systems development lifecycle. warnings were so common that operators were desensitized to them.46 Existing testing programs are simply too limited to enable DOD to have a complete understanding of weapons system vulnerabilities, which is compounded by a shortage of skilled penetration testers.47. Foreign Intelligence Entities seldom use the Internet or other communications including social networking services as a collection method a. They make threat outcomes possible and potentially even more dangerous. Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently told the Defense Media Activity the private sector's cyber vulnerabilities also threaten national security because the military depends on commercial networks. 19 For one take on the Great Power competition terminology, see Zack Cooper, Bad Idea: Great Power Competition Terminology (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 1, 2020), available at . The most common configuration problem is not providing outbound data rules. Over the past year, a number of seriously consequential cyber attacks against the United States have come to light. 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